Abstract Allaz (1992) and Allaz and Vila (1993) show that in an oligopolistic industry the introduction of a futures market that operates prior to the spot market induces more competitive outcomes. Hughes and Kao (1997) show that this result presumes that firms' future positions are perfectly observed, and that when firms' positions are not observed the Cournot outcome arises. We study an alternative formulation of observability, where the behavior of participants in the futures market is explicitly analyzed, and show that this approach leads to different results. Imperfect observability induces more competitive outcomes than Allaz and Vila's model.
Introduction
The strategic impact of futures markets in oligopolistic contexts has attracted attention recently. In a Cournot duopoly, Allaz (1992) shows that, if …r m s can sell in a futures market previous to the spot market, the strategic interactions result in a more competitive outcome (in the sequel we will refer to this model as Allaz's basic model) . In a later work, Allaz and Vila (1993) show that this pro-competitive e¤ect increases as the futures markets open more often. However, Ferreira (2003) shows that if the futures market has in…nitely many moments in which trade is allowed, the result is that not only the procompetitive e¤ect may disappear, but that the monopolistic outcome can be sustained in equilibrium. Taking these results together, the implications for the design of a futures market in this context are that the market maker must set speci…c (…nitely many) moments to trade in the futures markets. Hughes and Kao (1997) explore the role played by the observability of futures positions for the result in Allaz (1992) to hold. More speci…cally, they take Allaz's basic model and …n d that, in the spirit of Bagwell (1995) , if …r m s do not observe each other's actions in the futures market, the procompetitive e¤ect does not arise, and the model yields the standard Cournot outcome. This result agrees with intuition; it is the knowledge that the other …r m observes one's commitment in the futures markets that makes …r m s willing to use this market strategically. The implications for the design of futures markets, thus, seem to favor transparency.
More recently, Mahnec and Salaniè (2004) show that, if …r m s compete a la Bertrand with di¤erentiated products, the introduction of a forward market softens competition when this market opens once before the spot market. Hence, the design of futures markets ought to take into account the strategic variable of the oligopolistic …r m s . Liski and Montero (2005) consider an in…nitely repeated oligopoly where, in each period, both a futures and a spot market are open. In the futures market …r m s may contract quantities for any future spot market. In this situation, they …n d that the presence of the futures market makes collusion easier in the sense that it requires a lower discount rate than in the case without futures market.
All previous works impose the no-arbitrage condition that futures and spot market prices must be the same. This condition is standard and can be easily justi…ed. Allaz (1992) explicitly models a set of speculators who act competitively to drive the pro…ts to zero, resulting in equal futures and spot prices. Hughes and Kao (1997) implicitly assume the existence of these speculators to justify equal futures and spot market prices. However, the behavior of these speculators is not modeled and, thus, the model in Hughes and Kao (1997) must be understood as model in a reduced form.
In this paper we also take Allaz's basic model and study the role of observability of positions in the futures market, but we model explicitly the role of the speculators that trade in the futures markets. We propose a simple futures market game in which …r s t …r m s decide how much to sell in this market, and then competitive speculators simultaneously set a price at which to buy those quantities. The speculator that o¤ers the highest price buys the total quantity (up to a tie-breaking rule). In Allaz's basic model the speculators choose the level of forward purchases based on their risk attitude. However, in our model, since speculators are risk neutral, they will be willing to buy as much as they can if the futures price is lower than the expected spot price. In this setting we …n d that if speculators observe perfectly …r m s ' futures positions then the result is the same as in Allaz's model when speculators'risk attitude tends to risk neutrality.
However, when trying to model the absence of observability, things are far from trivial. In our model, the knowledge of the speculators may be transmitted to the …r m s through the equilibrium price in the futures market. Hence we need to assume that speculators do not observe total futures market quantities in order to have imperfectly informed …r m s . With this new assumption we …n d that the conclusion in Hughes and Kao (1997) may not follow, i.e., that the equilibrium does not necessarily imply a reversal to the Cournot outcome. In fact, both the Cournot and the competitive outcomes are sustained in equilibrium. However, only the competitive outcome looks reasonable after certain stability considerations are added. The reason is that now …r m s take advantage of the speculators'lack of knowledge and sell as much as they can in the futures market if the equilibrium price in this market is above the competitive equilibrium. Being anticipated, this behavior can only lead to the competitive price in equilibrium. However, we do not read this result as a case for opaque futures markets (at least not yet), as the assumption of total ignorance of positions in the futures market is clearly an extreme one. Rather, this result says that Hughes and Kao's reduced form may not be the only possibility to extend Allaz's basic model, and therefore that Hughes and Kao's result is not satis…ed in general as the role of observability may depend drastically on the way the futures markets is organized.
Finally, we consider the case of partial observability that includes the previous analysis as particular cases. In this general setting we characterize the set of prices that can be sustained in a Bayesian perfect equilibrium in pure strategies for some knowledge structure. If we rule out the extreme case in which positions are not observed (when we get the competitive price), we …n d that this set of prices is bounded away from the competitive price, and that it has the price in Allaz's basic model as a maximum.
In the absence of other reasons for using futures markets, the conclusion for designing futures markets thus seem to favor opacity, but only as long as it is possible to make speculators at least partially ignorant of total quantities in this market. If speculators know these quantities, futures prices will be informative regardless of the opacity of this market, and the decision on transparency versus opacity must be taken based on other grounds.
In Section 2 we present the basic model. In Section 3 we present the models for di¤erent assumptions on observability. Section 4 presents a discussion and Section 5 concludes. Consider a duopoly where …r m s produce a homogeneous good at zero costs and compete a la Cournot in a market where demand is given by p = A q if q A, and p = 0 if q > A. Suppose that before producing and selling in the spot market, …r m s may sell in advance part of their production in a futures market. Denote by s i and f i the quantities sold by …r m i in the spot and futures market, respectively, and write q i = s i + f i , with q = q 1 + q 2 : Assume that (f 1 ; f 2 ) are observed when …r m s sell in the spot market. A strategy for …r m i is a pair (f i ; s i (f 1 ; f 2 )) : Finally, let us introduce a no-arbitrage condition that requires that both futures and spot prices be the same. The game tree is depicted in Figure 1 .
Firms'payo¤s are i = p (f i + s i ). This game corresponds to the model in Allaz and Vila (1993) when there is only one period to sell in the futures market. It also corresponds to the model in Allaz (1992) when …r m s are risk neutral, and where a no-arbitrage condition substitutes the speculators.
The unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in non-weakly dominated strategies is readily calculated backwards. If positions in the futures market are observable, given f 1 and f 2 , in the spot market …r m i solves:
The solution gives the reaction function s i = . To understand why this occurs, notice that if, for whatever reason, it is known that Firm 2 does not use the futures market, then Firm 1 chooses f 2 = A. The pro-competitive e¤ect is caused as …r m s strategically commit some production level in order to change the Cournot game they play on the spot market.
The strategy pro…les in which q 1 , q 2 A are also SPE, but with …r m s playing dominated strategies. Instead of ruling out dominated strategies, we could have introduced a production cost (as in Allaz and Vila, 93) , but this option has the consequence of making the analysis in Section 3 far more complicated. Likewise, we have assumed that …r m s can only take a short position in the futures markets. A long position by Firm i is implied by a negative value of f i . In this section, as well as in the next, all equilibria that come after interior solutions to the …r m s ' m a x i m i z a t i o n problems include non negative forward positions. Nevertheless, to simplify matters in equilibria after corner solutions, we will keep this assumption in the sequel. If contracted quantities in the futures markets are physical deliveries that take place at the spot market opening, then it is natural that producers cannot take long positions.
Case 2. The result in Hughes and Kao
Hughes and Kao (1997) consider Allaz's basic model and show that when …r m s ' f u t u r e s positions are not observed, the introduction of a futures market has no impact. To see this, consider the same model as before, and assume that quantity f i is not observed by …r m j 6 = i; (in particular, the futures market price is not observed). A strategy for …r m i is now a pair (f i ; s i (f i )), and payo¤s are i = p (f i + s i ). As before, and following Hughes and Kao (1997) , the no-arbitrage condition is imposed. The game tree is depicted in Figure 2 .
The next proposition shows the only Bayesian perfect equilibrium (BPE) of this game in non-dominated strategies. The presentation of the model and the proof are somewhat di¤erent from those in Hughes and Kao (1997) , but the results and the arguments are essentially the same.
Proposition 1 Consider the game in Figure 2 , with payo¤ s as described before. Then, the only BPE in which players use non-dominated strategies is the following: Firm i chooses f i = 0; and
, and Firm i believes with probability one that it is in the node after f j = 0.
Proof. First show that the strategy is indeed a BPE. In the equilibrium …r m s are playing the Cournot outcome, with pro…ts given by i = A 2 9
: Standard Cournot analysis shows that there is no pro…table deviation from s i . To check that there is no pro…table deviation from f i = 0 consider f 0 i > 0, while f j = 0. After this deviation s i changes to s
. To show that the BPE is unique consider any other strategy (f 1 ; f 2 ) in which one …r m , say i, chooses f i > 0. Again, Cournot analysis in the second stage indicates that, in equilibrium,
: Suppose now that, instead of f i , …r m i plays f 
, and
. In the last expression observe that, for every initial f i , pro…ts achieve a unique maximum at f
. This means that the only case with no pro…table deviations is f i = 0. The equilibria in dominated strategies are similar to those in Case 1.
This result shows that …r m s are unable to commit unless their futures positions are observable. Observability is therefore a necessary condition to obtain the pro-competitive e¤ect of futures markets. As we shall see, when the futures market is modeled in more detail, this conclusion does not hold in general.
A model with speculators
In this section we study the role of observability in more detail. Hughes and Kao (1997) suggest that the pro-competitive e¤ect of a futures market found by Allaz (1992) arises only if positions in the futures market are observed, and that if they are not, the equilibrium outcome reverts to Cournot. However, Hughes and Kao's result is based on two implicit assumptions. The …r s t one is a strong version of the no-arbitrage condition: the price in the futures market must be the same as in the spot market in every contingency. This means that the two prices have to coincide, not only along the equilibrium path, but also along deviations from the equilibrium. The second assumption is that …r m s do not observe prices in the futures market. Firms detect deviations only when they produce and sell in the spot market. Let us discuss these assumptions in more detail.
(i) The strong no-arbitrage condition. It is most natural to require that, in equilibrium, futures and spot prices must be the same. If not, some speculator can pro…t from buying in one market and selling in the other. Arbitrage opportunities exist unless prices are identical. Take, then, an equilibrium situation in which the no-arbitrage condition is satis…ed, and consider the consequences of a …r m deviating by selling a larger quantity in the futures market. This implies an increase in the total quantity sold in the aggregation of both markets, and a lower price in the spot market. Should this imply also a lower (and identical) price in the futures market? If agents have perfect information of what is going on in the futures market, this seems the only reasonable consequence. On the other hand, if agents in the futures market do not have perfect information, they may not detect deviations (or, at least, the exact size of them), and the price in the futures market may not re ‡ect the price that will prevail in the spot market, where Cournot competition in the residual demand (after discounting futures sales) reveals the spot price. The existence of an agent that can foresee this di¤erence in prices may not be the only natural assumption. In order for the futures price to re ‡ect the new quantity, the deviation must be anticipated. However, there are two reasons why this may not be the case. First, once a strategy pro…le is considered as an equilibrium candidate, there may be more than one possible deviation to anticipate. How do agents know which one is actually taking place to adjust the price? Second, the pro…tability of a deviation may depend on the reaction of other agents, and, then, on the price induced by the deviation. These considerations call for a detailed model linking deviations with prices.
(ii) Observability of prices in the futures market. In the case where agents have perfect information about quantities sold in the futures market it is hard to justify that …r m s may not know about them. After all, by selling a small quantity in the futures market, any …r m may enter the market and know the price, and a fortiori, the quantities sold. Therefore, if one wants a model in which …r m s are not fully aware of quantities sold in the futures market (out of the equilibrium path) then one also needs to have that speculators are not fully informed either. Understanding these issues requires modeling how agents and …r m s gather information.
From the discussion above, at least three possibilities arise: Case 1. Future and spot market prices coincide in every contingency, and …r m s observe quantities (or prices) in the futures market (Allaz, 92) .
Case 2. Future and spot market prices coincide in every contingency, but …r m s do not observe prices or quantities in the futures market (Hughes and Kao, 97) , and Case 3. Future and spot market prices coincide along the equilibrium path and …r m s observe prices, but not quantities in the futures market.
In the previous section we presented game forms for cases 1 and 2. Next we present explicit game forms representing subcases of Case 3, which deals with a weaker version of the no-arbitrage condition and opens up new possibilities, depending of how deviations from equilibrium are observed and how they a¤ect the price in the futures market. The di¤erences in the game form highlights the merits of each one of the cases. In particular, cases 1 and 2 do not explicitly model the demand side of the futures market, while Case 3 does. Furthermore, in Case 3, the arbitrage condition is a consequence of the equilibrium itself, not an assumption, as in cases 1 and 2. In Subcase 3.1 below (Proposition 2) in which …r m s do not observe quantities in the futures market our result is equivalent to that in Case 1 as the price in the futures market is fully informative. However it is remarkable that Subcase 3.2 (Proposition 3) in which …r m s observe futures prices that are not informative is very di¤erent to Case 2, and yields a reversal to perfect competition rather than to Cournot. Subsection 3.3 analyzes the general case of imperfect observability.
3.1 We a k version of the no-arbitrage condition: f 1 + f 2 observed by speculators.
In the previous cases prices in the futures market were automatically set equal to spot market prices. To introduce prices in the futures market as an independent variable, we add new players that select these prices. The new game is as follows. In a …r s t stage …r m s simultaneously decide positions in the futures market (f 1 and f 2 ). In the second stage, and after observing the actions in the …r s t stage, n speculators simultaneously o¤er a price at which to buy the total quantity f 1 + f 2 . If Speculator j o¤ers the highest price (say p j ) she buys all future quantities and makes pro…ts given by
, where p s is the price in the spot market. In this case, the futures price is p f = p j . If the highest price (and, then, futures price) p f is o¤ered by m speculators, each one of them buys 1 m of the futures quantities and has pro…ts given by
. Note that, under these conditions, speculators behave competitively (like in a standard Bertrand model). In the third stage, and after observing prices in the futures market, …r m s sell in the spot market. Since we are interested in the role of observability in the futures market, we keep things simple in the spot market in the sense that, as in the previous models, …r m s compete for the residual demand, which is obtained after substracting the forward positions. In other words, we assume that speculators play no role (behave competitively) in the spot market. The game is depicted in Figure 3 where, for simplicity, only two speculators are shown. Nodes a 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 and a 4 belong to di¤erent information sets of Speculator 1. Similarly nodes b
The payo¤s for the …r m s are calculated as i = p f f i + p s s i . A speculator is to be understood as an agent that can make a potential pro…t from buying in one market and selling in another one at a higher price. The demand in the futures market is thus created if the spot price is expected to be higher than the price in the futures market. Proposition 2 shows that this case is equivalent to Case 1. As mentioned before, the reason is that futures prices are fully informative of the futures positions (because speculators are fully informed of the quantities sold in this market). , and …r m s sell s 1 = s 2 = max fp 1 ; :::; p n g in the spot market.
Proof. In the third stage …r m s are playing the Cournot outcome,
, which implies p s =
, and therefore, will not deviate from it. Knowing this, in the second stage, speculators will choose
as the only possibility in equilibrium. In the …r s t stage, …r m s must solve (1), as in Case 1, to …n d their best reply at this stage. The solution gives
. To see that the equilibrium is unique notice that, in the third stage …r m s are playing the unique equilibrium strategy, speculators will deviate from strategies that do not imply
, and that the solution to …r m s ' m a x i m i z a t i o n problem in the …r s t stage is unique.
3.2 We a k version of the no-arbitrage condition: f 1 + f 2 not observed by speculators.
We have just seen that the introduction of informed speculators does not make any di¤erence with respect to the situation without speculators, but with informed …r m s , as the price perfectly re ‡ects the information. Next we show that the introduction of uninformed speculators is not equivalent to the model without speculators and with uninformed …r m s . We start by looking at the extreme case, opposite to Case 3.1 above where f 1 + f 2 is observed, in which buyers in the futures market do not observe total positions in this market, i.e., we have a game as before, except that speculators cannot condition their actions (p 1 ; :::; p n ) on the quantity f 1 + f 2 . In the next subsection, we will consider a general case that includes 3.1 and 3.2 as subcases. We chose to present the extreme cases …r s t to facilitate the discussion. The game form is the same as in Figure 3 , except that now nodes a
) belong to the same information set of Speculator 1 (2)
The key feature of this game is that the demand in the futures market does not react to …r m s ' d e v i a t i o n s . This opens the possibility for di¤erent prices in the two markets as a result of deviations. The lack of information in the model does not allow arbitrage between them. However, in equilibrium, both prices have to coincide since the equilibrium must be anticipated by all players in the game.
Proposition 3 shows that, in this setting, both the competitive and Cournot outcomes can be obtained. However we will see that only the competitive outcome satis…es certain equilibrium selection criteria.
Proposition 3
To show that f 1 A; f 2 A consider …r s t the case where f j < A; but still , and pro…ts i = A f j 2 2 > 0. Finally, if f 1 + f 2 < A, standard Cournot analysis implies s 1 = s 2 = p s > 0 in equilibrium, in contradiction with the already established result that s 1 = s 2 = p s = 0: Hence, the equilibrium requires f 1 A; f 2 A, p s = p j = s i = 0. It is straightforward to check that this is indeed an equilibrium as pro…ts are zero regardless of unilateral deviations.
(ii) The only possibility for an equilibrium with p s 6 = p f requires that p f = 0. As in (i), p f > 0 makes any …r m willing to sell as much as possible in the futures market. Also, p f = 0 is only possible if speculators cannot pro…t by buying in the futures market to sell in the spot market, and this can only happen if F = f 1 + f 2 = 0 (no one is selling in the futures market.) Once F = 0 is established, the standard Cournot equilibrium must follow in the spot market. Firms do not want to deviate from f i = 0 to f 0 i > 0 as this implies no pro…ts in the futures market and will decrease pro…ts to
Notice that only equilibria of type (i) satisfy the weak version of noarbitrage. The no-arbitrage condition is not a behavioral imposition but it is rather a consequence of the equilibrium. Equilibrium (ii) does not satisfy the no-arbitrage condition because nothing is sold in the futures market.
It turns out that the fact that equilibrium (ii) does not satisfy the weak version of no-arbitrage makes it a less likely equilibrium. First we construct an intuitive argument to support this claim. Then we connect it to the literature of equilibrium selection. In Section 4.4, when discussing risk aversion, we provide one more reason to rule out the equilibrium in (ii) 1 . One of the …r s t things to highlight in this case is not only that speculators observe nothing about quantities o¤ered in the futures market, but that the winner is forced to buy any quantity at the quoted price. With these premises it should not come as a surprise that …r m s will sell a high quantity in the futures market at any positive price. Being aware of this behavior, speculators choose p j = 0 in both types of equilibria.
To understand why equilibrium (ii) is not reasonable consider again the strategy consisting of not selling in the futures market and selling the Cournot quantity in the spot market. Speculators'best reply correspondence contains all possible prices (pro…ts are zero in all cases), in particular, it contains p j = 0, which, together with f 1 + f 2 = 0; drives the equilibrium. If there is a small possibility that speculators choose p j = " > 0 (e.g., by mistake), …r m s will anticipate pro…ts by entering the futures market and o¤er a positive quantity in this market. A large enough quantity will even compensate for any cost to enter in this market.
The concept of stable set of equilibria in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) actually rules out equilibrium (ii) on these grounds. More technically, this particular perturbation of speculators'choices has no equilibrium that is close to equilibrium (ii), as f i = 0 cannot be a best reply for …r m s . Equilibria in (i), on the other hand, are stable as any perturbation on the way players choose have equilibria close to them.
Nevertheless, as we will see next, this is a very extreme and peculiar case of a more general and interesting one, where the issues discussed here are not relevant.
3.3 A general case: f 1 + f 2 observed imperfectly by speculators.
In Case 3.1, speculators observed perfectly …r m s ' f u t u r e s positions, whereas in Case 3.2 they did not observe them. In this section we model a situa-tion of partial observability, in which speculators only observe whether total quantities in the futures market belong to a certain information set. In the …r s t stage …r m s choose simultaneously quantities f 1 and f 2 within the interval 0; in which sets are either intervals of length of at least a pre-…xed >0 or real numbers. When the set is an interval, it will be called an interval of uncertainty. Denote this set of partitions by U. Given F = f 1 + f 2 , in the second stage Speculator j's information partition is a set U j U. These assumptions imply that speculators observe F or, at least, are able to determine that F is in a certain interval of uncertainty. All speculators have the same information partition on futures quantities; i.e., for all j, U j = U. Speculators choose prices contingent on information sets. In the third stage …r m s observe prices set by speculators and decide s 1 and s 2 . Pro…ts are calculated as in the previous cases.
The game form is the same as in Figure 3 except that now nodes belong to the same information set of a given player according to the stated condition (recall that a …r m always knows its own past actions). Case 3.1 is the limit of this general case when speculators'information partition gets …n e r , and Case 3.2 corresponds to the situation in which speculators'information partition has only one information set containing all nodes such that
Denote by p the price in the spot and futures markets when both coincide. Proposition 4 shows that the range of prices that can be obtained with di¤erent levels of partial observability is is the price obtained with perfect observability. The intuition is the same as in Proposition 3: speculators know that the imperfect observability of futures positions induce …r m s to increase their sales in the futures markets to take advantage of a high price. The size of this increase depends on the precise information structure. In any case, speculators know that …r m s will produce too much and anticipate lower prices with imperfect observability. For very low prices (lower than A 6 ), however, deviations are no longer bene…cial for the …r m s because the gains in the futures market do not compensate for the losses in the spot market.
The case of p = 0 is explained because of the discontinuity of the demand function at this point, which allows for arbitrary deviations when the lack of observability is absolute. Finally, the case of p s = A 3 occurs because of the discontinuity of speculators'best reply (they may set p f = 0 at F = 0, but
if F is very small), and only in a non-stable equilibrium.
Proposition 4 In the game described above the only prices that can be sustained in a BPE in pure strategies with an information partition U U are p = 0, p s = can be sustained in a BPE; only notice that speculators'information sets are in U: The rest of the proof is dedicated to showing that the only other prices that can be sustained in equilibrium are . Recall that to sustain a price p > 0 in a BPE, the required total quantity must be q = A p, and also that the spot quantities must satisfy s 1 = s 2 = p. Total futures positions compatible with these conditions require
. To sustain p take f 1 > 0 and f 2 > 0 such that F = f 1 +f 2 = A 3p. In a BPE speculators must assign probability 1 to the total quantity F , and o¤er prices p j = p: If …r m s choose f 1 and f 2 ; Firm one's pro…ts are
: To consider possible deviations from the proposed scenario we need to distinguish several cases. Given the structure of information sets, it is straightforward to see that there are only three possibilities for F : (i) F 2 u for some interval u 2 U. (F cannot be known with certainty.) (ii) F 2 U and all points in a neighborhood of T are also elements of U. (F and a neighborhood around it can be known with certainty.) (iii) F 2 U and is the frontier of an interval u 2 U such that F = 2 u. (F can be known with certainty, but is in the frontier of an interval of uncertainty.) (i) Consider …r m one's deviation to (f . Because speculators do not observe the deviation, the futures price does not change along the equilibrium path: i.e., for all j 2 N, p j =
. Because the price in the futures market does not change, Firm 2 does not change its spot quantity along the equilibrium path, thus
, and then s
. The spot price, however, changes to p
as Firm 1 changed its quantities in both the forward and spot markets. Then Firm 1's pro…ts are given by
. The di¤erence in pro…ts is
This di¤erence is positive for any f 0 1 6 = f 1 such that f 0 1 +f 2 belong to the same information set as F for speculators, which means that no equilibrium exists in this case.
(ii) A deviation to f 0 1 within a neighborhood of f 1 gives pro…ts
The di¤erence in pro…ts is now given by the expression 
and the maximum for this expression restricted to f (5A 17f 1 5f 2 3p 0 ) (A f 1 f 2 3p 0 ). The expression in the second parenthesis is positive. The expression in the …r s t parenthesis attains its in…mum with respect to p 0 , and restricted to p
, and the maximum of 0 also corresponds to f 0 1 = f 1 ; which implies that …r m one's deviation should be f
The expression for 0 is the same as in (iii.c). The second parenthesis is negative, and the …r s t parenthesis is always non negative if A 3f 1 f 2 0: By symmetry, to get that no pro…table deviations exist for the other …r m we have that A 4f 2 f 1 0 and A 3f 2 f 1 0. I.e., there are equilibria as long as 2A 5f 1 5f 2 0 and 2A 4f 1 4f 2 0, which implies
: It is interesting to notice that, according to the proof of Proposition 4, the futures quantity f 1 + f 2 , and the information partition U U that support prices p 2
in a BPE in pure strategies satisfy one of two following conditions:
(a) (Case iii.c in the proof) A 4f 1 f 2 > 0 and f 1 + f 2 is located at the left end of an interval of uncertainty, (b) (Case iii.d in the proof) A 4f 1 f 2 < 0 and f 1 + f 2 is located at the right end of an interval of uncertainty.
Discussion

Market design
Our results may be sensitive to the particular way competition is modeled in the futures market. In our model …r m s …r s t decide their futures positions, and then speculators bid to buy these quantities. This is a standard model of a …r s t -p r i c e , sealed-envelope auction or a Bertrand price-competition. Notice that speculators know the equilibrium quantities, but may not know precisely the quantities after a deviation occurs. Speculators are, of course, aware of their ignorance and react to it. The equilibrium is the result of these reactions.
Other models are possible (and even more realistic) to describe the futures market. For instance, if …r m s are allowed to sell in the futures market with a positive reservation price (meaning that if the price is zero no trade takes place), then, no matter how close to zero is this reservation price, the strategy of f i = 0 is dominated. But then, speculators may also have the possibility of buying only a limited quantity in the futures market. These alternatives may rule out some of the extreme cases, but open the possibility for more complicated supply and demand schedules as strategy choices, and will greatly complicate the model.
The present work makes the point that it is precisely the study of these alternatives that, in the end, will tell us about the role of observability in the futures markets. In this work we did not attempt to provide a detailed study of di¤erent institutional designs of futures markets. Rather we provide the …r s t model that, to our knowledge, considers partial observability in the futures market, and explicitly takes into account the behavior of all agents in this market. Furthermore, we have shown that, by doing this, our …n d i n g s are di¤erent from the ones found in the reduced form models studied in the literature.
Having said this, and admitting it is too early to derive recommendations for the design of futures markets in oligopolistic industries without further studies, it may still be worthwhile to provide a sketch of the design of a market that conforms with the assumptions in this paper.
First, the transparency of the futures markets is not required to promote competition. In fact, transparency may make collusion easier to implement as deviations can be monitored. Opacity, on the other hand, can promote competition if speculators are not informed of total quantities (if they are informed, the result is the same as with a transparent market). The question is, then, how to design a market that invites the participation of speculators without giving them any information. A literal reading of the model would require that the futures markets opens only once, and that the market takes the form of an auction where the auctioneer collected bids, in the form of price per unit, for an unknown quantity. The speculator that submitted the highest bid would be forced to buy the whole quantity.
Here we suggest a more realistic possibility. Given that there is an upper bound to what …r m s can sell in the futures market, say A, the auctioneer divides A in k lots of size a = A=k: Of course, if the total quantity is q; with l q=a l + 1, there will be l lots with a quantity of a, one lot with quantity q la, and k l lots of quantity zero. All this is common knowledge. Then a …r s t -p r i c e , sealed-envelope auction takes place for each one these lots. Participants in the auctions (speculators) decide in which of the auctions to participate, but there will be no information about q or l; or about the size of a particular lot. To spread speculators over all lots, a limited number of bidders for each lot could be set. All auctions take place simultaneously, and the actual quantity of each lot (q j 2 fa; q la; 0g, j = 1; :::l) is revealed after the winner is proclaimed. The winner of lot j buys the total quantity q j . Given that the demand is completely elastic at the anticipated futures price, p f , each of the auctions will give p f as the equilibrium price. (This is not true in models where the demand is not perfectly elastic.)
This type of auction has some resemblances with Treasury auctions, where it has been shown that …r s t price auctions may be more e¢ cient than secondprice auctions.
Market microstructure
There is a large literature on Market Microstructure Theory (see O'Hara (1995) and references within) studying the exchange of assets under explicit trading rules. One of the approaches in this literature takes the form of information-based models, where the trading process is viewed as a game involving traders with asymmetric information. However, we are not aware of any work in which intermediaries have an information structure comparable to the one we develope here. Furthermore, the source of asymmetric information in the Theory of Market Microstructure is usually the asset's true value. The present work suggests that the value of the asset itself may be a¤ected by the traders decisions, as the value of a futures position depends on the quantities sold by any of the …r m s in the futures market. The reason lies, of course, in the oligopolistic structure of the underlying spot market. Thus we can see the present work as a motivation for a possible extension of the models in Market Microstructure Theory.
Even if the sources for asymmetric information are di¤erent, it is interesting to note that the literature on market microstructure has found that more transparency is not always better in terms of e¢ ciency. See Madhavan (2000) .
Speculators'information
In the general model, all speculators have the same information about futures quantities. However, we can extend the results to the case where speculators may have di¤erent information partitions (e.g., because they observed di¤erent private signals). To see this, consider Speculator j's information partition, U j , and de…ne b U as the union of all partitions U j (j 2 f1; :::ng): The possibilities for total future quantities F are now:
(i') F 2 u for some interval u 2 b U. (F cannot be known with certainty by any speculator.) (ii') F 2 b U and all points in a neighborhood of T are also elements of b U. (F and a neighborhood around it can be known with certainty by some speculator.) And (iii') F 2 b U and is the frontier of an interval u 2 b U such that F = 2 u. (F can be known with certainty by some speculator, but is in the frontier of an interval of uncertainty of all speculators.)
One can now rewrite Proposition 4. The existence of no equilibrium in Case (i') is shown as in Case (i). In Case (ii'), the deviation f 0 is observed by some speculators, which may or may not change future prices (because the new price o¤ered by theses speculators may or may not be lower than the price set by the others). If the futures market price changes, the argument is the same as in Case (ii) in the proposition, if it does not change, we argue as in Case (i). The same argument works for Case (iii').
Risk aversion
Except for equilibrium (ii) in Case 3.2, all of the results are robust to small departures from the speci…cation of the model (linear and certain demand, and risk neutral …r m s ) . If …r m s are risk averse and demand is uncertain, equilibrium (ii) can no longer exist because risk averse …r m s have a strong reason to enter the futures market (to reduce risk). This means that p j = 0 cannot be an equilibrium in this market unless the price in the spot market is also zero. Thus, risk aversion provides another argument against the Cournot outcome if positions in the futures market are not observed (not even by speculators).
It is interesting to note the similarity between this situation and the resolution of the famous Grossman-Stiglitz paradox (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) ) also in the context of futures contracts (with asymmetric information about the real value of the asset): if price reveals all private information, and can be observed costlessly, then there will be no incentive to gather costly private information. But then no private information will be revealed, and there will be an incentive to gather it. Grossman himself had argued that the addition of a suitable source of noise would avoid the paradox, but as Bray (1992) observes, all one requires is that there exists some hedging motive for trading the asset. In our context, the Cournot outcome occurs if no one enters the futures market, which allows for a zero price in this market (or any other). At a zero price there is no incentive to enter the market. If mistakes are added the zero price disappears, but this addition is not necessary as the existence of uncertainty and of risk averse …r m s may be enough to rule out the zero price.
Opacity versus transparency
According to Hughes and Kao (1997) …r m s perform better in a situation in which the futures market is opaque (they get the Cournot pro…ts) than when it is transparent (they get the outcome found in Allaz, 1992) . This means that, given the choice, they prefer an opaque market. However, if both types of markets are present, then …r m s face a prisoners'dilemma, as they have an incentive to use the transparent market to get a higher market share. Our model, however, indicates that, if the demand side of the futures market is sensitive enough in the sense of setting prices that re ‡ect actual quantities, the observability of futures quantities by …r m s does not make any di¤erence. Therefore, …r m s will be indi¤erent if given the choice between the two types of markets. On the other hand, if prices in the futures market are not sensitive to changes in quantities, a more competitive outcome may result. In this case …r m s prefer the transparent market and to face no prisoners'dilemma.
The liberalization of the power market in England and Wales provides an interesting case. In this industry there were two futures markets: Contracts for Di¤erences (CfD) and Electricity Forward Agreements (EFA), where the CfD is much more opaque. According to estimates in Power UK (1997 and 1998) , around 1998 the coverture of the CfD's was nearly 90% of the market, while the EFA's accounted for less than 30%. This contradicts the conclusions of Hughes and Kao (1997) , but not ours if prices are informative. Of course, our model does not explain the fact that …r m s prefer the opaque market, but is compatible with these preferences if there are reasons that justify them. For example, …r m s may show a collusive behavior that may be better implemented in real life in the more opaque market. This possibility has been suggested in Powel et al. (1994) . Allaz (1992) and Allaz and Vila (1993) show that, if a futures market is added to the spot market in an oligopolistic industry, …r m s show a more competitive behavior. Hughs and Kao (1997) argue that …r m s must have perfect information about futures quantities for this result to hold, and that without this information …r m s behave as in Cournot. We show that while perfect information leads to the result in Allaz and Vila (1993) , the imperfect information may not lead to Cournot, but to a more competitive outcome. If the demand side in the futures market is informed, the fact that …r m s are not informed is irrelevant, as prices reveal the information. This later case provides a theoretical model for the observed behavior in the futures markets of the UK power industry, which contradicts the results in Hughs and Kao (1997) . Our model suggests that the microstructure of the futures markets needs to be studied with more care, and that the conclusions obtained in a reduced form of the market may not be compelling. 
Conclusion
